Free Will?

The issue of free will and determinism is something I am thinking about a great deal these days. These few brief notes are simply orientation statements.

The following is a simple discussion of the issue of free will as it applies to the science of psychology and had it has been understood by many different psychologists. 

Why are psychologists interested in this issue?

Historical reasons

Since at least the writings of the French philosopher Renee Des Cartes (1596 - 1650) this issue has been a central part of Western philosophy. As Des Cartes writings and arguments had a major impact on the very early history of psychology, and as his writings raised issues that are still central to philosophy, it is not surprising that psychologists are still interested in this issue.

To UNDERSTAND the CAUSES of thoughts and behaviour

Science is, at it's most basic level, the attempt to 'understand by causes'.  The doctrine of DETERMINISM takes the following position:

“ ... ... ... in the case of everything that exists, there are antecedent conditions, known or unknown, given which that thing could not be other than it is ... ... ... More loosely, it says that everything, including every cause, is the effect of some cause or causes; or that everything is not only determinate but causally determined ... ... if true, it holds not only for all things that have existed but for all things that do or ever will exist.”

Taylor, R (1963) Metaphysics   Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall

`Everything that exists` includes people and their thoughts and behaviour . A `strict` determinist holds that `thought` and `behaviour` are no different from other `things` or events in the world.

The issue then becomes - Are thoughts and behaviour the SAME KIND OF THING OR EVENT as, for example, chemical reactions, earthquakes, neurons firing etc., etc.

We don't, usually, ask if chemicals `AGREED` to react, or if an earthquake `felt like` happening, or if neurons `decide` to fire. If we do we are committing the sin of ANTHROPOMORPHIZING - we are ATTRIBUTING human abilities and characteristics to non-human things (including animals).

No one seriously believes that chemicals agree, or earthquakes have feelings, or neurons make decisions. But we DO attribute these abilities to people - they are a key part of our `everyday` concept of human beings of our `common-sense` psychology.

Because of this psychologists must take seriously the `everyday` view that people DECIDE, AGREE (or not) with each other, and, in so many ways, exercise FREE WILL.

Possessing `free will` depends upon having a `mind`, because deciding, agreeing and so on are exactly the sort of things we `do` with our `mind`.

However, while it may be the case the having freewill implies having a mind, having a mind DOES NOT imply having freewill. All our decisions, choices, agreements and so on may still be CAUSED (determined) even though it doesn't `feel` like they are. These arguments lead directly into the realm of logic and philosophical argument, where the discussion gets extremely complex. I will avoid this path here.

To investigate the influence of mental events over behaviour

Even if we accept, temporarily, that HUMAN thinking and behaviour are different from all other natural phenomena (which is a very debatable claim!) and that they are not caused (determined) in the same way (or a different kind of explanation is needed just for them), for most of it's history psychology has operated AS IF there was no difference.

Since 1913 when John Watson launched the `behaviourist revolution` in psychology, psychologists have tried to emulate the physical sciences and this took the form, mainly, of using EMPIRICAL METHODS and, particularly, the CONTROLLED LABORATORY EXPERIMENT. To adopt such techniques implicitly accepts a deterministic view of human behaviour by accepting the deterministic and `mechanical` view of physical science.

In one very important sense, then, ALL psychologists ARE `behaviourists`:

METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIOURISM is the belief that EMPIRICAL METHODS, especially the experiment, is the only way to collect data about human thought processes and behaviour that can be QUANTIFIED and STATISTICALLY ANALYSED. The majority of psychologists today would call themselves methodological behaviourists.

Since about 1950, however, most psychologists would DENY that they are PHILOSOPHICAL BEHAVIOURISTS. Philosophical behaviourism in it's most extreme form is the position taken by Watson himself - to deny the very existence of the `mind` and mental processes. If you reject the `mind` you reject `freewill` too. All behaviour is a mechanical series of cause and effect. B. F. Skinner took a slightly less extreme position. He did not deny the existence of mental processes, he simply regarded them as irrelevant to understanding and predicting human behaviour. He rejected the notion of freewill, although he readily accepted that people BELIEVE they have it.

Philosophical behaviourism involves EXPLICITLY rejecting freewill, while methodological behaviourism is an IMPLICIT rejection of it.

Many who readily accept methodological behaviourism would, at the same time, reject philosophical behaviourism. They will accept the validity of their experimental and research results, and at the same time say they believe in human freewill. This appears to be a total contradiction, but they often propose various tangled philosophical arguments to get around this. However, these proposed `solutions` to the contradiction often cause more trouble than they are worth. But, there is no SINGLE, clear cut solution to this problem. IF you are a psychologist, then, somewhere down the line you are accepting some degree of DETERMINISM in human behaviour. If you don't accept any determinism you are not a psychologist and you are outside of the world of rational thought and clear-cut, well founded evidence.

To DIAGNOSE MENTAL DISORDERS

When ABNORMAL behaviour is discussed, diagnosed and treated then psychologists and psychiatrists are making more or less explicit judgements about freewill and determinism.

In a very general sense, a mental disorder can be seen as a partial or complete breakdown of the CONTROL a person has over his/her behaviour, emotions and thoughts:

In COMPULSIVE behaviour people are `compelled` to do something, they can't help it;

People are ATTACKED by panic;

People are OBSESSED by thoughts;

People become VICTIMS of thoughts inserted from outside and are under EXTERNAL control.

In all these examples `things` are happening to, or being done to, the individual instead of the individual doing them.

In most Western legal systems being judged has having lost `normal` control (`being of unsound mind`) is a legally acceptable defence in criminal law. There is a whole complex body of law relating to mental health and psychiatrists who specialise in this field are called FORENSIC PSYCHIATRISTS.

Without going into detail, and noting that this is a very debatable issue indeed, forensic psychiatry IMPLICITLY accepts a clear cut difference between `normal` behaviours where the individual has `control` (freewill) and `abnormal` behaviour where their actions are determined for them.

To discuss MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Underpinning the whole issue of legal responsibility is the presupposition that people are, at least some of the time, able to CONTROL their behaviour and to CHOOSE BETWEEN different course of action. If this were not assumed how could we ever discuss moral accountability?

In most everyday actions, situations and interactions we simply ASSUME responsibility - our own and that of other's - unless we have reason to doubt it.

An influential figure in this debate (as in many others areas of interest to psychology) is Renee Des Cartes. In his theorising about human behaviour he made a fundamental distinction between MIND and BODY. The `mind`, according to Des Cartes, is a non-physical entity. The `body`, however, is a physical entity that is, basically, a MACHINE. This is the philosophical theory known as `Mind-Body Dualism`, or `Cartesian Dualism`.

According to Des Cartes, a person is an AGENT whose behaviour is governed by no other law than that which the agent him/herself creates. He wrote:

“But the will is so free in it's nature, that it can never be constrained ... ... ... And the whole action of the soul consists in this, that solely because it desires something, it causes a little gland to which it is closely united to move in a way requisite to produce the effect which relates to this desire.”

Des Cartes (1649)

According to Des Cartes the `little gland` was the Pineal Gland, situated near the corpus callosum, which joins the two hemispheres of the brain together. Today, it is known that the pineal gland plays an important role in sleep, but it is NOT where the `mind` or `soul` live, nor is it the `meeting point` between mind and body as Des Cartes thought.

According to Des Cartes the `mind`, via the pineal gland, uses it's immaterial (non-physical) powers to move the material (physical) body. When we behave in a voluntary manner this, he said, is what happens. This dualistic distinction makes sense of our everyday belief that there are (i) conscious, purposeful and voluntary actions and there are also, (ii) mechanical, unconscious and involuntary actions. The `mind` acts on the `body` in the first case. The `body` acts mechanically and in a caused (determined) manner in the second case.

Dualism also makes sense of ethical and moral issues. Morality assumes that we can `control` our actions and we are not simply mechanical `reflex machines` and that we can make actual choices.

Even though there is no scientific basis for Cartesian Dualism (the issue of the `separateness` of mind and body is still a hot debate in psychology), and the philosophical contradictions are immense, maybe the language it uses ( of a conscious, deciding, mind and a controlled, but mechanical, body) is useful in discussing morality? Even Skinner, who believed freewill was a total illusion, argued that we should still use the language of moral choices because it has a role in reinforcement and punishment.

This approach, in a sense, simply evades the issue of freewill and determinism and says that, because it has some practical and everyday applications, we will, under certain circumstances, simply ASSUME freewill exists.